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Introduction
This article examines the role of incentives and
technological change in the economic performance of
the Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs). To
begin, it sets out a number of hypotheses which have
been advanced in various parts of the literature to
explain their successful economic record. The
hypotheses may be grouped into two categories
according to whether international or national factors
are dominant.
International factors
The 'state of the world economy', which explains
the simultaneous rise from the mid-1960s of the Asian
and Latin American NICs, most of which have had
very different histories and natural endowments.
(Important variables include the growth of world
trade, availability of international credit and direct
foreign investment.)
The international diffusion of technology and the
'catch-up process'.
Geopolitical factors (for example, the strategic
interest, particularly of the US, in countries like South
Korea and Taiwan in the post-war period, and the
importance of Japanese colonialism in the same
countries).
National factors
The establishment by the state of correct prices
and incentives, which have facilitated an efficient
private allocation of resources in accordance with the
country's short-run comparative advantage.
y) Direct allocation of resources by the state, rather
than through market processes, in order to develop
areas of the economy perceived by the state to have
longer run potential.
vi) Natural endowments and the country's historical
and cultural inheritance (cg ports in the case of Hong
Kong and Singapore, efficient agriculture resulting
from land reform in Taiwan and South Korea, the
/1)9 Bulletin. 984, vol 15 no 2. institute itt Development Studtes. Snssex
50
inheritance of a relatively rich stock of skills and
attitudes to work, etc).
vii) Specificities of the labour market emphasising,
depending on the writer's views, the positive effects of
the absence of strong trade unions on the efficient
functioning of the labour market, or the subordi-
nation of labour in order to serve the sectional
interests of capital.
While all these hypotheses have appeared in the
literature, and while all those who have written on the
Asian NICs have stressed the importance of more than
one of them, it is hypotheses iv) and, to a lesser extent,
y) that have tended to dominate the discussion. For
this reason the arguments of two authors who have
perhaps been most influential in supporting hypothesis
iv), Little and Balassa, will be briefly examined in the
next section.
The Views of Little and Balassa
For Little (whose views are expressed in a number of
places including Little [1979] and various parts of
Little [1982]) the economic success of the Asian NICs
'can be attributed to good policies and the people'.
Although international factors such as the ability to
borrow and the attraction of foreign investment have
been important in varying degrees for the Asian NICs,
these factors themselves are 'primarily a matter of
domestic policies' [Little 1979:36].
But what are the 'good domestic policies' to which
Little refers? The central point is that national policy
must facilitate an allocation of resources in
accordance with the country's short run comparative
advantage. Accordingly, investment criteria must be
consistent with comparative advantage: 'investment
planning criteria and the analysis of comparative
advantage, originally two separate specialisations in
economics, have come together. This is as it should be,
since, in an open economy, they must be the same
thing' [Little 1982:138]. Furthermore, every economy
is open in the sense that the possibility of international
trade exists. When investment is consistent with
comparative advantage, and accordingly when
national policy does not discriminate against exports,
the latter will grow. Little therefore concludes that
'export incentives (and disincentives) do work. . . That
incentives work is shorthand for saying that export
demand and domestic supply are both elastic. Export
pessimism had been based largely on gloomy views
about the growth and elasticity of world demand'
[Little 1982:139]. In the case of the Asian NICs, Little
stresses the positive effects of the introduction of
'almost free trade conditions for exports':
The major lesson [emerging from the study of
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore]
is that labour-intensive export-oriented policies,
which amounted to almost free trade conditions for
exporters, were the prime cause of an extremely
rapid and labour-intensive industrialisation which
revolutionised in a decade the lives of more than
50 million people, including the poorest among.
them [Little 1979:34, 1982:141,262].
The next step in the casual chain links the growth in
exports with growth in output and employment:
While the export boom can certainly be attributed
to the policy reforms resulting in such trade
regimes, it would be wrong to attribute the whole
success of these countries, in terms of employment,
growth, and income distribution, to such trade
policies. Nevertheless it is impossible to doubt that
they played a very large role [Little 1982:141].
There is strong evidence that output and growth
improve as a higher proportion of domestic
production is exported. Among the reasons given
for this by Bhagwati were that consequentially
increased imports reduced the chaos in the pattern
of import substitution incentives and ensured a
freer flow of inputs with benefits for capacity
utilisation and the size of stocks held. The growth
of exports made it easier to borrow, and more
direct foreign investment was attracted, some of it
to the relatively labour-intensive export sector. It
seems to me that another more dynamic reason,
valid at least for the Far Eastern countries, was that
exports were very profitable at both actual and
shadow prices and that this led to a rise in savings
and investment [Little 1982:142].
In passing it should be noted that Little acknowledges
that, with the exception of Hong Kong, the Asian
NICs have adopted near-free-trade only in the export
sector: 'Hong Kong has always been as pure laisser
faire as conceivable; the others are far from laisser
faire but adopted virtually free-trade policies for
exporters in the early or mid-l960s' [Little 1982:262].
We are now in a position to summarise Little's
neoclassical 'story of capital accumulation and the
adjustment to changing factor prices':
Consider the following propositions. As investment
proceeds, [and we may add, as exports expand] the
demand for labour rises. Eventually, provided it
proceeds fast enough to more than cope with a
growing population, this will cause a rise in real
wages and a fall in the rate of profit, which in turn
will cause the introduction of more capital-
intensive techniques. These propositions are the
essence of a neoclassical theory of growth. They
look like a very reasonable description of the
history of the developed countries, and more
recently of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and possibly others. They seem to
presuppose only profit maximisation, and not
necessarily perfect competition. It does not require
any statement to the effect that the rate of interest is
equal to the marginal productivity of capital, for
the amount of capital and changes in it can be left
undefined' [1982:23-4].
With regard to technology Little argues that there is a
significant degree of substitutability between the
labour and capital inputs with the result that 'there is a
lot of room for selecting more labour-intensive
techniques of production while taking the shelf of
known and available techniques as given' [1982:180].
Accordingly:
Recent stress on the inappropriateness of existing
technology has been overdone. The earlier vision,
that one of the great advantages of backwardness is
that more modern techniques can be acquired from
abroad far more cheaply than they can be
developed and invented, is still valid . . . Korea,
Taiwan and Hong Kong have shown that a
sufficiently labour-intensive development . . . was
possible without any need to develop new labour-
intensive methods [1982:181].
Little's perspective on the Asian NICs follows directly,
as he informs his readers in the second chapter of his
¡982 book, from his starting paradigm:
Neoclassical economics can thus be described as a
paradigm that tells one to investigate markets and
prices, perhaps expecting them often to work well,
but also to be on the watch for aberrations and
ways of correcting them. Perhaps the single best
touchstone is a concern for prices and their role. It
is not a central tenet of a neoclassical outlook that
the price mechanism will achieve Pareto-optimality
in production [Little 1982:25-6].
The views of Balassa as expressed in his edited volume
[1982] are similar to those of Little. This large study
involves an examination of trade incentives and
economic performance in the late 1960s in li semi-
industrial countries, which in 1973 produced 68 per cent
of the exports of manufactured goods by the
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developing countries. A further 16 per cent came from
Hong Kong. These countries were distinguished
according to the outward - or inward - orientation
of their development strategies where this was defined
according to 'the absence, or presence, of an anti-
export bias'. They were divided into four groups, the
first of which, consisting of South Korea, Singapore
and Taiwan, is of interest for present purposes. The
latter countries 'avoided a bias against exports and
against primary activity, provided broadly equal
incentives to most exports . . . ensured the stability of
the incentive system, [and] had the best export
performance' [59]. As with Little, while increased
exports result from the incentive system which does
not discriminate against exports, the consequences is
an increase in economic growth:
Export expansion appears to have had beneficial
effects on economic growth. . . These results reflect
the benefits derived under an outward-oriented
strategy from resource allocation according to
comparative advantage, increased capacity utili-
sation, and the exploitation of economics of scale.
Gains in employment may also be obtained as
exports increase the demand for labour and
thereby improve income distribution. The rise in
real wages and lessened discrimination against
agriculture also tend to reduce income inequalities.
The expansion of exports and the consequent
growth of GNP have been the result of the
incentives applied [59].
Furthermore, Balassa argues, export expansion may
contribute to growth 'by easing the foreign exchange
bottleneck that has often been an obstacle to economic
growth in developing countries'. In addition, apart
from these once-for-all gains, 'such policies may
provide a continuing stimulus to economic growth
through technological change that is undertaken in
response to competition abroad, increased savings,
and the more efficient use of increments in factor
supplies' [51].
Some Complications
The chain of causation in the explanation of the
economic performance of the Asian NICs offered by
Little and Balassa can be represented roughly as
follows: short run comparative advantage ø-irivest-
ment ø.exports .economic growth - (eventually)
rising real wages øfalling rate of profit -*.choice of
more capital-intensive techniques. (Little is more
explicit than Balassa about the latter part of the casual
sequence.)
However, there are a number of complications with
this explanation, some of which will be discussed
briefly here.
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Economic theory and the Asian NICs
While, as shown above, both Balassa and Little point
to an empirical association between exports and
economic growth in the Asian NICs, and provide
some loosely formulated reasons for this association,
the theoretical casual mechanism linking exports and
economic growth is less clear. Some aspects of this
observation were elaborated in an important
conference on the advanced developing countries in
the Pacific Basin, the proceedings of which were
published in 1981 [Hong and Krause 1981].
In one of the papers, Krueger, who undertook one of
the major studies on the export-promoting countries
[Krueger 19781, discusses the relationship between
free trade, exports and economic growth. 'At first
glance', she notes, 'the superiority of the export-
promotion strategy appeared to vindicate the view of
trade theorists, who had advocated free trade and who
saw export promotion as coming closer to a free trade'
regime than did import substitution [Krueger 1981:3].
However:
The simple 2x2 comparative advantage model
would seem to suggest that growth rates will be the
same under autarky and under free trade, once the
once-and-for-all losses associated with accepting a
non-optimal trade policy are absorbed. Thus, there
are no theorems from standard trade theory with
regard to the effect on the growth rate of departures
from optimal trade policy [6].
Secondly, Krueger points out, 'the difference in
growth rates [between the "outward" and "inward"
oriented economies] seems to be greater than can
conceivably be accounted for by the exporting sector
of the economy'. [4]. (For evidence that domestic
demand expansion has been much more significant
than export expansion as a source of growth of
manufacturing demand in South Korea, and even
more so in Japan, see Nishimizu and Robinson
[1983:25]). Krueger therefore concludes that 'What
emerges is a set of questions which call for a great deal
of research. It is not enough to know that export
promotion outperforms import substitution. It is
equally important to understand why' [Krueger
1981:5]. In her paper Krueger goes on to examine
dynamic effects in infant industries under export-
oriented regimes.
The empirical study of the South Korean case
Further complications are raised by the careful
empirical study of South Korea. In the same
conference collection Chong Hyun Nam [1981]
provides a comparable updating for 1978 of Westphal
and Kim's estimates of effective rates of protection
and effective subsidies for the year 1968. To the extent
that these magnitudes provide an adequate indication
of prevailing incentives,' Chong Hyun Nam's figures
raise a number of difficulties.
In the first place, far from South Korea 'avoiding a
bias against exports and against primary activities'
[Balassa 1982:59] Chong Hyun Nam shows that 'the
relative incentives accorded to the manufacturing
sector, which accounted for nearly 90 per cent of
exports in 1978, reveal that export sales, on average,
receive greater incentives than domestic sales, with 16
per cent effective incentives for export sales versus
four per cent protection for domestic sales' [Chong
Hyun Nam 1981:205]. In commenting on the 16 per
cent figure, Corden states that 'this figure seems
surprisingly low. . . It would not be surprising if an
alternative calculation yielded a figure pf perhaps 30
per cent' [Hong and Krause 198 1:212]. The effective
subsidies for exports are largely the result of the ready
availability of credit at substantially below market
rates of interest [Chong Hyun Nam 1981:195]. In the
case of primary activities Corden concludes that
'protection for agriculture is very high, averaging
more than 70 per cent, and has greatly increased since
1968. This alone is sufficient reason not to describe
Korea as a "free trade" country' [Hong and Krause
198 1:212].
Accordingly, far from avoiding a bias against exports
and primary activities, South Korea has discriminated
in favour of these activities. This presents further
problems for theory, as Findlay points out:
In terms of the standard theory of trade and
welfare, a bias in favour of exports is no better in
principle than a bias against them . . . In
comparison with the optimal free trade level a
"right wing deviation" in trade policy that
discriminates in favour of exports is no better than
the equivalent "left wing deviation" that discri-
minates in favour of import substitution. It is
therefore hard to see why an export-promotion
strategy should produce such successful results,
since both types of bias are equally to be
condemned from the standpoint of static allocative
efficiency [Hong and Krause 1981:31].
Findlay concludes that 'it is clear that an answer must
be sought outside the conventional bounds of the
standard model, in the murky but relevant waters of
Krueger flotes that 'it is impossible for any researcher to estimate the
value, which must have been considerable, of the informal
incentives which the government provided to exporters . . . This
included the attention of the highest officials to exporters'
difficulties; the somewhat more lenient perusal of tax returns than
happened to other businesses; the more rapid expedition of
paperwork and government formalities .No one has yet devised a
means of estimating the importance of these types of considerations,
but it cannot be doubted that they affected the relative profitability
of exporting contrasted with production for the domestic market'
[Hong and Krause 1981:215]. See also Jones and SaKong [1980].
such concepts as X-efficiency and "learning by
doing" [311.
However, the South Korean economy has not only
been trade-biased (ie discriminated in favour of
exports), it has also been industry-biased (ie
discriminated in favour of certain productive sectors
of the economy). As was shown earlier, Little and
Balassa have stressed the importance of the
introduction of near-free trade, and therefore the
following of short run comparative advantage, in the
export sector. However, parts of the South Korean
economy have been heavily protected although, as we
shall see, exports have also been important from these
protected sectors. Chong Hyun Nam notes that
'despite the import liberalisation attempts since the
early 1960s, most of the import-substitution industries
are still highly protected by various import controls'
[187]. In effect 'there seems to have been little if any
overall import liberalisation during the 1968-78
period' [202]. While the effective rate of protection in
1978 for the manufacturing sector was relatively low at
5.3 per cent (Balassa method), this aggregate figure
conceals a wide variation. Furthermore, the high rates
of effective protection were not confined to the so-
called heavy industrial sectors (the development of
which has been criticised as a result of its capital- and
foreign-exchange intensity by Little [1982:11,146,241;
1979:32] and LaI [1983:45-8]). The effective rate of
protection in 1978 for the five most heavily protected
sectors of the economy was as follows: transport
equipment, 135 per cent (mainly ships - South Korea
has now become a major world exporter of ships);
consumer durables, 131 per cent; agriculture, forestry
and fishing, 77 per cent; machinery, 47 per cent; and
non-durable consumer goods, 32 per cent. While, as
we have seen, authors like Little have praised South
Korea for its 'good policies' in the export sector,
surprisingly little is known about the significance of
the more highly protected sectors for economic
performance. As Corden notes:
With regard to protection of manufactures for the
home market one needs to know how significant
the high protection cases are, how important are
they at a point in time in terms of value added and
employment, and what role have they played in the
growth process. Furthermore, it would be
interesting for example to have an explanation for
the reasons for the particular pattern of dispersion
[of effective rates of protection] with regard to the
roles, of sectional pressures, of assessment of future
world market prospects, and of particular
philosophies of development [Hong and Krause
1981:213].
The writer who has perhaps been most aware of the
departure of the South Korean case from the standard
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trade and industry models is Westphal. In an
important article [198 la] Westphal criticises the view
that 'the closer is the policy regime to free trade, the
better is the industrial performance, because a free
trade regime necessarily means uniformity of
incentives vis-à-vis trading opportunities and empiri-
cally appears to assure the requisite high levels of
export achievement' [1]. In his study of infant industry
protection in South Korea Westphal argues that the
industry-bias and relatively high rates of protection in
selected industries is a source of strength rather than
weakness, since it is precisely the discrimination that
encourages the growth of these infant industries.
Furthermore, he cites evidence to suggest that in some
cases, though not necessarily all, infant industries have
rapidly achieved international competitiveness. How-
ever, both here and in Westphal [198 lb], it is stressed,
in line with the above arguments of Krueger and
Findlay, that a particular importance attaches to the
exporting activities of infant industries as a result of
the advantages that such activities provide. With
regard to economic theory Westphal also notes that in
South Korea "tailor made" infant industry protection
has typically been afforded via quantitative restrictions
on imports' [Westphal 1981 b: 16]. This flies in the face
of standard theory and policy conclusions which
suggest that subsidies are to be preferred, followed, in
this order, by tariffs and lastly quantitative restrictions
on the grounds that the correct use of the former
instrument comes closest to correcting distortions of
their source [Corden 1974; also Little 1982:68,70,140].
It should by now be clear that we have moved some
way from the woridview expressed by Little and
Balassa. First of all the link between free trade on the
one hand and economic growth on the other is
weakened if not broken. Thus a recent article
concludes that 'Westphal's argument holds up the
hope that the benefits of export expansion on total
factor productivity growth can be realised simultan-
eously with the protection phase, but only if the
incentives are tied to export performance' [Nishimizu
and Robinson 1983:32, emphasis added]. Secondly, if
protected infant industries are to play an important
role in the development process, as Krueger, Findlay
and Westphal suggest, then the use of short run
comparative advantage as a 'guide post' to resource
allocation is far more restricted than suggested by
Little and Balassa. By definition, infant industries do
not enjoy a short run comparative advantage. This
raises, thirdly, the question of how governments
should go about selecting industries for promotion.
Furthermore, it would be helpful, as Corden suggests,
to know more about how governments such as those
of South Korea and Japan, have in practice selected
industries and firms for special promotion. Fourthly,
the instruments chosen by the South Korean
Government to protect infant industries, namely the
54
preference for quantitative restrictions, suggest that
the time may be ripe for a rethink of the standard
arguments regarding the costs and benefits of
subsidies, tariffs and quantitative restrictions. Similarly
in Japan, industries selected for development 'were
afforded the protection of high tariffs and quantitative
import controls' [Allen 1981:90]. This is implied by
Westphal when he notes 'it is not my purpose to
inquire why most governments appear to favour
protection as the principal instrument of infant
industry promotion or to argue that they are correct in
this respect. Instead, I simply want to establish that
infant industry protection can "work" in the sense of
fostering the rapid achievement of internationally
competitive levels of productivity' [Westphal 1981 a: 16].
While the relative merits of subsidies, tariffs and
quantitative restrictions have hitherto been discussed
within the conceptual framework of static resource
allocation, it would seem to be necessary in any
'rethink' to take account of the crucial question of
uncertainty. From the point of view of a government
such as that of South Korea, which seems to have been
concerned to encourage and, at times, coerce private
firms to move into particular areas of production, one
of the main advantages of using quantitative
restrictions is that they provide the firms concerned
with a greater degree of certainty regarding market
size and hence sales and profitability than do tariffs
(unless prohibitive) or subsidies.
The Technology Dimension
Let us recall the role played by technological change in
the discussion thus far of the explanation of Asian
NIC economic performance. (Technological change
here may be thought of as new ways of transforming
inputs into outputs, including the production of new
or altered products.) Technological change has
entered the discussion in two areas: first, in connection
with the dynamic effects of exports on growth,
productivity and the attainment of international
competitiveness - Findlay's 'murky waters of X-
efficiency and learning-by-doing'; and secondly, via
Little's discussion of the choice of increasingly capital-
intensive techniques when real wages eventually begin
to rise, thus economising on increasingly scarce labour
resources. However, if the explanandum is the
economic performance of the Asian NICs, including
their output and productivity growth, then it is clear
that the technology dimension merits further
attention.
To begin with, it is interesting to compare Little's
account of the propositions of neoclassical growth
theory referred to above with Hicks' discussion of 'the
mainspring of economic growth' which he discussed in
his Nobel Prize address [Hicks 1981]. Notable is the
extent of agreement in terms of causation. In
discussing the characteristics of 'the double-equili-
brium path' (je savings-investment equilibrium and
full employment) Hicks notes: 'This is the chain of
causation: from investment to final output, from final
output to wages, from wages to the rate of profit on
new investment, and thence back on investment itself
- the latter step in the substitution of capital for
labour' [127]. However, for Hicks the role of
technological change is central in initiating this casual
sequence: 'The mainspring of economic progress. . . is
invention; invention that works through the rate of
profit: Each invention gives an impulse' to the
economy [28]. Accordingly an understanding of the
innovative process is important: 'it would help us to
understand the innovative process, as it works in this
century, and so to know, better than we do, how far we
can count upon steadiness in the flow of innovation'
[29].
Similarly, in understanding the mainspring of
economic growth in the Asian NICs the role of
innovation is also central. However, in the case of
these and other developing countries the innovative
impulse comes primarily from outside, through
technology imports. These imports are facilitated by
the earnings of foreign exchange through exports and
in turn they enable further increases in productivity
for both the domestic market and exports. Accordingly,
exports influence economic growth, not only through
direct dynamic effects, but also indirectly through the
import of improved processes and products. However,
it is now recognised that the successful import of
technology is a far more complicated process than was
believed.
Although it is relatively simple to import and use a
machine, most technology imports are far more
complex (eg the import of entire processes and plant).
The problem is that even where blueprints and other
details are provided by the technology supplier, there
is still a large element of what Nelson has referred to as
'implicitness' in the technology being transferred.
Furthermore, the technology will have to be adapted
to conditions that are always, to a greater or lesser
extent, unique in the using firm. Accordingly, a degree
of indigenous technological capability is required in a
successful transfer of technology. Such capabilities
will also be necessary in the initial search and
evaluation of technologies (cf hypothesis (ii) above).
To some extent developing countries will benefit from
an ability to bring about technological change that is
not functionally related to the process of successfully
importing technology. While there are other examples,
that cited most frequently in the literature is the social
desirability of establishing a capital goods sector that
will facilitate the adaptation and modification of
processes and products which play an important role
in the growth process. Economists are now coming to
realise that the cumulative significance of such
incremental changes is probably greater than that of
major technological changes. An important set of
questions arises in determining how far a country
should go at any point in time in developing local
technological capabilities rather than importing
technology. However, the economist's usual Injunction
that the long-run social benefits must exceed the long-
run social costs will usually not be of great use in
facilitating decisions ex ante as a result of the
unpredictable elements influencing such costs and
benefits.
Nevertheless, there will eventually come a stage in the
country's industrial development when it will be
socially and, possibly, privately profitable to enhance
substantially local technological capabilities. In the
USA and Japan this came relatively late in the
industrialisation process. However, Westphal more
than anyone else has argued that 'deep' levels of
knowledge and technology are not necessary in the
earlier stages of industrialisation. He and Dahlnian
argue that 'as Korean experience demonstrates .
high indigenous levels of all types of technological
mastery are not necessary for the initial stages of
industrial development; in the Korean case, a mastery
which has been mainly confined to production
engineering has been sufficient' [Dahlman and
Westphal 1982:133]. While the comments in this and
the previous paragraph have dealt with technology
imports and local technological capabilities, a
dimension that has been missing in much of the
discussion of the effect of incentives ïn the Asian NICs,
the question referred to above regarding the
relationship between exporting and improvements in
productivity and output is also central, though no
more will be said about it here.
Finally, efficient production, including production for
exports, is the result of a complex interplay of a large
number of factors of which prices are only one,
although they are very important. Anyone even
slightly familiar with the Japanese case will realise the
importance of non market processes in the sphere of
production. Yet, as Leibenstein notes 'mainline theory
does not address itself to the non market
production activities within the firm . . . X-efficiency
theory focuses on these considerations' [Leibenstein
1981:105]. Any attempt to explain the economic
performance of the Asian NICs cannot afford to
exclude a careful analysis of these non market
processes.
Conclusion
Ifa single conclusion emerges from this article it is that
we are still a long way from a comprehensive
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explanation of the economic performance of the Asian
NICs. Not surprisingly, this conclusion is reminiscent
of that emerging at the end of the long debate in the
economics literature on the causes of differing growth
rates. Our degree of ignorance may still be relatively
great, but as the discussion here of the South Korean
case shows, there is a good deal to be learned from the
detailed empirical study of this and other Asian NICs.
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